Introduction
he following four essays respond to the question of "Literary History and the Religious Turn" in different ways.
In "The Religious Turn (to Theory) in Shakespeare Studies, " Julia Reinhard Lupton opens the cluster with a call to view the "religious turn" as a chance "for a return to theory, to concepts, concerns and modes of reading that found worlds and cross contexts, born out of specific historical situations, traumas and debates, but not reducible to them. " For Lupton, Shakespeare's plays "are voiced "ex cathedra" . . . in a profane space cleared and illuminated by their own visceral staging of religious motifs. " This staging, then, becomes an opportunity for a rigorous engagement with religion as a form of thinking, that takes on "the big questions and systematic frameworks of psychoanalysis, philosophy, theology, and politics from the other side of our immersion in tracts and ephemera. "
Graham Hammill responds to Lupton's call for a return to theory, by analyzing the operation of the theological imaginary in the political theologies of Machiavelli and Spinoza.
"The Religious Turn: Exegesis and the Theological Imaginary, " locates the roots of the logic of the sovereign exception in the sixteenth and seventeenth century political theologies of Machiavelli and Spinoza. Hammill shows how both thinkers "turn one facet of religion against another, pitting exegesis against the theological imaginary in order to explore religion as a form of political thought. " For each thinker, sovereignty's capacity relies on its relation to a theological imaginary. While Machiavelli "decathects" the theological imaginary upon which sovereignty rests by turning religion against itself, Spinoza demonstrates how the Hebrews re-cathect it, by transferring the mysteries of State (arcana imperii) necessary for effective rule, to the mysteries of the people.
Complex linguistic operations lie at the center of both political theologies. As Hammill points out, these are not merely "rhetorical" operations, but are theatrical and real.
In "More Other than You Desire, " Ken Jackson asks, "What is the right genre to speak of religion?" How are we to respond to this real Other that is religion? Reading the
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English Language Notes 44. 1 Spring 2006 T "absolute alterity of the call" of law in The Merchant of Venice, Jackson stresses the difficulty of really turning to religion without reducing it or confusing it with the familiar: "This is a far harsher, difficult and perhaps impossible movement toward the other than we generally prefer . . . " (7) . Jackson considers the difficulty of returning to religion as a problem of our access code. In order to "get better at talking about the impossibility of accessing the other" that is religion, we need to respond to its modes of speaking, the logics-or il-logics-of religious thought. The religious "other, " as well as religion itself, as an Other, is not identical to, nor can it be subsumed to the ethical. Rather, what it presents is an absolutely other that I must "suspend the ethical" to access. Religion, thus, "points one in the direction outside or otherwise than reason. " Religion remains strange, uncanny, even somewhat wild, in that it does not lend itself to cultural, materialist, or historicist modes of analysis that attempt to tame its enigmatic nature.
In "Notes on the "Religious Turn": Mystery, Metaphor, Medium, " Philip Lorenz closes the cluster by attempting to respond to Jackson's call to attend to the challenges of our access to religion. Lorenz argues that the religious turn avoids the turns themselves, the tropes of theology that mediate our relation to the binding power of religion. Returning to Hammill's analysis of the media effects of the arcana imperii, Lorenz focuses on the difference between metaphor and mystery. If metaphor initiates a transfer of thinking, the enigmatic representational logic of mystery is designed to "shut down, " or "close the eye" on a certain metaphorical reading. Following Lupton's lead, Lorenz turns to these operations through theory, viewing them through the critical lens of Pierre Legendre's notion of a "textual unconscious. "
Taken together, the cluster of essay raises the following questions about the "religious turn" in early modern literary studies:
1. If the religious turn is a return to theory, as Lupton calls for, then which theoretical models are best equipped to view the "Other" that is religion?
2. How should we understand our relation to the religious turn? Can we, in fact, recover a sense of religious mystery when we read Renaissance texts, without being either subsumed by, or subjected to partisan or participatory readings? What does it mean to read religion through the lens of psychoanalysis or deconstruction? What kind of response or irresponsibility is that?
What we suggest is that religion itself, cannot be turned, or "returned" to in isolation.
The religious turn requires that we follow the dynamic and interactive historical relation between legal, constitutional theatrical, and theological history. More crossover work is needed among religious scholars, psychoanalytic critics, and literary scholars.
The religious turn is always a question of mediation, of the metaphorical potentiality built into the construction of the "religious" thing we are re-turning to. Religious metaphors have an intimate and complex relation with legal fictions and figures, to stage a conceptual and historical dance of thought. The scene unfolds in a space arched by several theologies, with vectors borrowed from a cancelled Catholicism (the intimations of Mariolatry and the cult of the saints), Pauline
Christianity (the spirit of faithful love animating the cold letter of Leontes's jealous law), and the pagan gods (Pygmalion and Galatea; humanist art and art theory). Mimetic naturalism rules the scene-the statue is really Hermione herself, sequestered in Paulina's quarters during the long winter of Leontes's atonement-and the only magic is theatrical. Here and elsewhere, Shakespeare has tapped the rich interference among the cultic strata of Europe's religious life in order to nourish his own art, serving up a magic as lawful as eating-natural and even necessary, rooted in the performative processes of the body, yet partaking in the congregational communion of the feast and triggering a luminous cascade of appearances made manifest. More than any other oeuvre of the period, the drama of Shakespeare-and perhaps this is what grants it something like the status of a third revelation in the history of European letters-crystallizes the epochal collision and collusion of religious and secular tendencies in the Renaissance at large. His plays mobilize exegetical narratives and typological rhythms of great authority and moment, only to release from their depths the profound profanities of sex, time, death, and laughter. The plays are voiced "ex cathedra, " "from the chair" of a religious sensibility internalized by catechism, yet they also issue (to abuse the phrase) "out of" or "after" the cathedral, performed in a profane space cleared and illuminated by their own visceral staging of religious motifs.
Religion has always formed a major tributary of Renaissance literary criticism, whether channeled into the "old" historicism of intellectual, political, and ecclesiastical history, or into the "newer" ducts of cultural and materialist approaches, where religion takes its
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English Language Notes 44.1 Spring 2006 A place after race, gender, and class as a determinate category of cultural identity. Read in relation to historicisms old and new, the "religious turn" in Renaissance studies is hardly a turn at all, but rather a reaffirmation of history's hold on what has been, through its constitutive debts to Renaissance humanism itself, a fundamentally historical discipline.
But there is a third way as well, reflecting religion's affiliation with philosophy and thought and its claims to universal rather than merely local cultural validity. After all, the phrase "the religious turn" migrates into literary history and criticism from its application to the career of the late Derrida, whose writings on gifts, ghosts, faith, and friendship addressed questions concerning religion. From this perspective, the "religious turn" in Renaissance studies represents the chance for a return to theory, to concepts, concerns, and modes of reading that found worlds and cross contexts, born out of specific historical situations, traumas, and debates, but not reducible to them. 1 I see the following maxims as fundamental to this new work on religion.
1. Religion is not identical with culture. Cultural studies works from the seemingly straightforward assumption that religion is an aspect of culture-in humanist accounts, because it forms part of the local practices, customs, and artifacts that make up civilization, and in materialist accounts, because religion is a species of ideology, supporting (and sometimes resisting) structures of power. The direction I am charting here rejects the assimilation of religion to the larger category of culture, positing instead that religion names one strand of those forms of human interaction that resist localization and identification with a specific place, time, nation, or language, installing elements of thought that stand out from the very rituals and practices designed to transmit but also to neutralize them. (Art forms a similar domain.) Like ghosts, religions leap across groups and epochs, and they practice cultural accommodation in order to survive rather than disappear into the contexts that frame them. This is not to say that religion does not participate in culture or ideology, but rather that what makes religion religion (distinguishing it from forms of identity such as nationality or ethnicity) is its absurd insistence and unlikely persistence beyond the logics of custom and habit, practice and power. Take the case of Judaism's "lawful eating": whereas the regional recipes cooked up by Jewish communities across the globe exemplify religion as culture, the singularity, severity, and absurdity of the commandment against mixing milk and meat that gives rise to these diverse cuisines in the first place reveals religion in its decisive separation from culture.
2. Religion is a testing ground for struggles between the universal and the particular.
Religion's absolutist claim to some form of universal validity is foreign to the relativism of culture, which is by definition founded on particulars. The universality of religion is not, however, a set of constant qualities or essences, but rather a recurrent struggle with universalism itself. "Universality" should be distinguished here from "universalism. "
While the latter is a species of ideology, an "inflated particular" in Ernesto Laclau's terms, the former aims for truth, often emerging precisely where universalism reveals the cynical violence of its self-interest-for example, when the disenfranchised wrestle the language of "emancipation, " "redemption, " or "fellowship" from a governing elite that has justified its power by monopolizing these same ideas. Unlike the territorial entrenchment of religious universalism (the "-ism" signaling complicity with ideology), the universality of religion is momentary and elusive, participating in what Slavoj Ž ižek has called "the fragile absolute. " We glimpse universality-kinship with the poor, love of neighbor, creaturely community-when we manage to disengage from the routines of reality through individual or collective acts of creative critique, whatŽižek calls, following Kierkegaard, "works of love" (128-29).
3. Religion is a form of thinking. By separating religion from culture on the basis of its bid for universality, the "religious turn" re-affiliates religion with thought-not only with the high tradition of formal theology, philosophy, and hermeneutics, but also with ordinary acts of rumination. In The Life of the Mind, Hannah Arendt defines "thought-things" as those speculative questions, inherently unanswerable, that nonetheless continue to engage human beings in their capacity as thinking subjects: "'Thought-things,' which Kant called 'ideas,' though never given to experience and therefore unknowable, such as God, freedom, and immortality, are for us in the emphatic sense that reason cannot help thinking them and that they are of the greatest interest to men and the life of the mind" (41). The "religious turn" encounters religion as a turn, a speculative turning-away from both nature and culture in their infinite variety to thought in its singular capacity to cut through the local habitations of lived experience. The "thought-things" of both formal and vernacular theology take shape in this cut, in the momentary suspension of acculturated embodiment that occurs when the mind lets itself go, following the twists and turns of thinking as such.
Religion in distinction from culture; religion as a search for universality; and religion as a form of thought: to bring these maxims back to literary studies, let's take the case of including the intimation of immortality transmitted within the wrinkled visage of mortality itself? These questions take their bearings from exegesis and iconography, and in this sense rely on the work of traditional historicism. By focusing on problems of political theology, including the symbolic life of sovereignty and the protocols of group membership, these questions also share some concerns with cultural studies. They differ from both, however, in so far as they do not restrict religious motifs to specific contexts, confessions, or power structures, but rather approach them as players on the experimental stage of thought, free to make new combinations and arrive at new truths through acts of criticism that are both thoughtful and creative. The religious turn as a return to theory addresses the big questions and systematic frameworks of psychoanalysis, philosophy, theology, and politics from the other side of our immersion in tracts and ephemera.
In the process, we aim to pursue forms of reading whose magic, like Paulina's, is lawful as eating: both intellectually serious (responding to scholarly research and debates) and subjectively significant (addressing both texts and readers as agents of thought).
University inding the right the genre to speak of religion, without reducing religion to something it is not, particularly without giving it over to the master anthropological discourse of early modern literary studies, is difficult, perhaps impossible. 1 So I will confess: My "turn to religion"-I cannot speak for others-occurred during an early modern studies conference sometime in the early 1990s, perhaps the golden age of "New Historicism, " while watching a presentation on the poor. The presentation was very good, based on careful archival research, and detailed the lives of these impoverished, marginalized others. I followed and tracked the presentation quite closely and was convinced by its arguments. I had done some research on early modern poverty myself and judged the scholarship solid, informed, certainly better than my own.
What I could not follow or track, however, was the presenter's clear compassion and empathy for the early modern poor, signaled by voice inflection when discussing the process whereby one was "othered" in early modern London, and pained facial expressions at the harsh forms early modern charity often took. Frankly, I have trouble mustering any such compassion or empathy for my next door neighbor let alone a vagabond who lived more than four hundred years ago in another country. This is not to suggest the presenter's compassion and empathy was somehow inauthentic. Indeed, how can one-with the exception of the current evangelical Christian president of the United
States-look so easily into another's heart? I am only confessing that I had and still have no corresponding affect to match the apparent affect of the presenter. I look for it, but I must confess, like Shylock looking for "charity" in the bond between himself and that ever generous and compassionate giver Antonio, "I cannot find it" (4.1.259-60).
This difference, this distance, between myself and the presenter would not be terribly What holds me in rapt attention, then, is not the ethical, but the other, the absolutely other that I must "suspend the ethical" to access. But how does one cut through the eth-ical/universal to think something "other" than the ethical? The unethical, again, or the "subversive" does not count: at our most subversive we are often at our most ethical. "I stretch every muscle to get a perspective, and at the very same instant I become paralyzed, " Kierkegaard writes in trying to think himself into Abraham, the one historical figure whose response to the call from the other to give death to Isaac seems to suspend the ethical, if only for an instant.
Stuck: I could not fulfill the ethical command of New Historicism to engage the other, but I could not ignore it either. As Emmanuel Levinas might put it, I felt myself held "hostage" by the other, held hostage by my responsibility for the other (117). My will was not my own, Laertes might say, a fact that might drive one mad, point one in the direction outside or otherwise than reason, ultimately dissolving-in that the other had a greater hold on me than "me"-the very "oneness" of the one. The split subject preceded New Historicism, of course, but to its credit that methodology's ethical demands had placed "me" very much in the position of the subjects split by the demands of early modern religion who could neither access nor ignore the "other" that existed in the most inward parts of themselves. To borrow St. Augustine's language, this may be the other "more inward to me than my most inward part. " 3 Or, perhaps, to stay in chronological order, I should turn the question around: maybe the still resonant religious demands of early modern religion had put me in the position of the split subject rendered paralyzed by the demands of New Historical ethics? Which is the religious here, and which the ethical?
II
Shylock, the Venetian court demands, must be merciful. But this is an impossible demand. As Portia admits, mercy "is an attribute to God himself" (4.1.190) . What the Venetians demand from Shylock, what the "Christians" seek from the "Jew, " is what Jacques Derrida identifies as the impossible, the gift. 4 As Lisa Freinkel writes, "Mercy is the grace that imputes righteousness where none has been deserved; it is that love, that faith that gives itself for nothing in return" (288). The "quality of mercy, " Portia says, is aneconomical, "not strained"(4.1.182). Like Shylock's "deed of gift" that the Christian play later seeks to recast as "manna, " mercy "droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven" (4.1.183). Shylock himself points out the contradiction, "on what compulsion must I?" provide this "gift. " The absolute alterity or otherness of the gift dissolves when it is compelled by human economics.
The critical assumption, like the assumption of the Venetian court, has been that Shylock has a "choice" to be merciful-truly "merciful"-or not. Intriguingly, the assumption has been that this "other" has what we think we have in New Historicism-an ethical ability to access that which is absolutely other, the impossible gift. We tend to assume Shylock could give-or forgive-perfectly, purely if he only so desired. The assumption has been that Shylock's "will" (4.1.83) is simply his own. But there is more other in this play (and in Shylock) than we-or the Venetian court-desire. We tend to ignore the fact that the law and not just Shylock's "humor" demands that he kill Antonio to honor the terms of the bond. The law calls for Shylock to kill Antonio and the court of Venice stands horrified, perplexed at this inability to locate the law beyond the law, but prepared to see the law enforced. We can imagine an other beyond the law that would salvage this situation, but we cannot realize it.
That the law calls for Antonio's death, and not just Shylock's whim, as he describes it, creates the dramatic energy of the famous scene. This demand of the law distinct from Shylock's "own" desire is registered most distinctly in the brief instance when Portia actually presses Shylock to take his "forfeiture" (4.1.333) without the "jot of blood" the play tries very hard to characterize this demanding "law" as "Jewish, " the play also reveals-perhaps against its own will-that the law is "Christian, " imposed by the Venetian court, necessary for the survival of the Venetian state.
Neither specifically Christian, nor Jewish, I would suggest the law comes from someplace else. The law is "other. " Let me recite Derrida's "pre-definition" of religion here.
However little may be known of religion in the singular, we do know that it is always a response and responsibility that is prescribed, not chosen freely in an act of pure and abstractly autonomous will. There is no doubt that it implies freedom, will and responsibility, but let us try to think this: will and freedom without autonomy. Whether it is a question of sacredness, sacrifi-ciality or of faith, the other makes the law, the law is other: to give ourselves back, and up, to the other. To every other and to the utterly other.
("Faith and Knowledge" 34).
Shylock acts willfully, but not autonomously, and gives himself up and over to the other, the law. There is more law here than we desire; or, more precisely, given that "the law is other, " there is, again, paradoxically "more" otherness than we desire. The subject Shylock we think we know in his desire to kill Antonio disappears at this instant when the call of the absolutely other holds Shylock, the Venetian court, critical response, and, perhaps, Shakespeare, hostage.
Shylock's response to the call of the law is, if we move more slowly, structurally speaking, a call to give-to give death. This is, in short, the call that suspends the ethical for
Kierkegaard's Abraham and that, for us, disallows any perspective on Shylock no matter how we stretch our critical muscles. There is a sense, in other words, in which Shylock acts "religiously"-"an oath, an oath! I have an oath in heaven" (4. titled Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, they cite several authoritative sources, including Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, but they do not mention Carl Schmitt. In some ways this is surprising since the two main assumptions behind the military strategy could have come straight from his 1922 monograph, Political Theology. The first assumption is that "there is no external adversary in the world that can successfully challenge the extraordinary power of the American military in either regional conflict or conventional war" once the United States decides to use its force to its fullest capacity; and the second, that even so, certain "grey areas" involving Operations Other Than War (OOTW) will arise that demand military attention. In short, we have the logic of the decision and the exception. In the space of the exception or the OOTW, the stated goal of shock and awe is to produce compliance through intimidation. While traditional war implies using enough force to prevail over an enemy, according to Ullman, Wade, et al., shock and awe implies using overwhelming force in an attempt to control the enemy's "will, perception, and understanding and literally make an adversary impotent to act or react. " It is a psychological as well as a physical attack and implies, among other things, the ability "to 'own' the dimension of time" (Ullman and Wade, "Intro").
A twentieth-century military report is an unlikely place to discuss the religious turn in the academic study of early modern literature, but, as I hope will be clear momentarily, the goals of this military strategy have their roots in a particularly early modern entanglement of politics and religion. In sixteenth-and seventeenth-century political thought, the strategy of shock and awe was mostly associated with the arcana imperii, the secrets of imperial power, often translated as the mysteries or mystery of state. As well as a particular strategy for responding to OOTWs, the mystery of state was also a general strategy for consolidating and sustaining sovereign power. The phrase arcana imperii comes from Tacitus's Annals, where Tacitus describes how the emperor Tiberius dissimulates, feigns conciliation, and pretends republicanism in order to protect and consolidate his
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English Language Notes 44.1 Spring 2006 I imperial rule. Not just rhetorical, however, the phrase also implies the use of violencemost often in the name of religion-to support sovereign power. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this phrase came to designate a form of political violence that is both theatrical and real-real to the extent that the violence is often enacted upon individual and collective bodies, and theatrical to the extent that its relation to the public intensifies its effects. Absolutist and proto-absolutist political writers such as Bodin, Clapmar, and Naudé associate the arcana imperii generally with "the uses of deception, extra-legal force, and the political manipulation of religion" necessary for effective rule and specifically with political acts that range from the murder of political rivals to the massacre of a portion of the population in order to ensure the stability of the state (Donaldson 112) . Although these acts were not often actually hidden from public view, absolutist and proto-absolutist political writers argued that they should be withheld from public judgment. The response of the public is not to judge, but to remain awestruck by the magnificent and sacred violence of the act. It is not just violence, then, but this particular epistemological relation to violence that makes the arcana what Tacitus calls "the substance of power" (2.36).
The proto-absolutist and absolutist writers who develop the arcana imperii give the conditions for the metaphysics of sovereign power that, as a strategy of intimidation and compliance, shock and awe assumes. Two early modern writers who develop this strategy against the metaphysics of the absolutist state are Machiavelli and Spinoza. Both assume that the persistent problem of the arcana imperii is political theology. That is, both assume that the sovereign's capacity to produce compliance through intimidation relies on a theological imaginary at the heart of the collective life. Moreover, both also assume a productively antagonistic relation between sovereign and political subject.
As Machiavelli puts it in The Prince, because people are "ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers, " a prince must impose force upon them to prevent their turning against him (33); and as Spinoza asserts in the Theologico-Political Treatise, because the state is "in greater danger from its citizens than from the external enemy, " often rulers try to persuade their subjects that "they were descended from immortal gods" (538). Rather than dissolve or suspend that antagonism, both Machiavelli and Spinoza attempt to claim it in order to turn it against absolutist sovereign power, Machiavelli by draining the theological imaginary upon which the state relies and Spinoza by subsuming absolutist political theology within a new, hypothetical form of government. Neither abandons religion, but each turns one facet of religion against another, pitting exegesis against the theological imaginary in order to explore religion as a form of political thought.
Each does this by giving an account of the Mosaic constitution. In Book Six of The Prince
Machiavelli claims that Moses succeeds in founding a new state because he used both religion and force to prop up his authority to rule. Moses was an "armed prophet" who arranged matters so that when the people "no longer believed, " they could be made to believe "by force" (13) Spinoza splits the scene of Moses's utterance into two. When the Hebrews first heard the sovereign command, they "harkened to Moses" and "resolved to transfer their rights not to any mortal man but to God alone" (539). While this first covenant is clearly a fiction, an act of interpretive bravado on Spinoza's part, it is also clearly a fiction of democracy. As Spinoza insists, since this transfer was not to an individual person or human collective, it must be understood as form of democracy in which "all had an equal right to consult God, to receive and interpret his laws, " and "to [share] equally in the government of the state. " Almost immediately thereafter, the Hebrews, "terrified and . . . thunderstruck at hearing God speak, " abrogate the first covenant and absolutely transfer to Moses their rights so that he becomes sole lawgiver, interpreter, and supreme judge (540). By splitting the covenant, Spinoza certainly produces democracy as the collective potential that the sovereign command presupposes and transforms. At the same time, by positing an originary democratic political theology, Spinoza shifts the arcana imperii so that it becomes the mystery of the people. Democracy is no solution to political theology. It is just another and-from the perspective of contemporary events-stronger form of it.
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University of Notre Dame Notes on the "Religious Turn": Mystery, Metaphor, Medium call, and a question:
Call hither, I say bid come before us, Angelo. What figure of us think you he will bear? For you must know we have with special soul Elected him our absence to supply, Lent him our terror, dressed him with our love, And given his deputation all the organs Of our own power. What think you of it? Measure for Measure (1.1.14-17)
Measure for Measure, Shakespeare's only play with a biblical title, opens with this question of the figure the substitute will bear. Will it be capable of filling in for an "absent" sovereign? To answer its own question, the play turns to a logic of transfer-or transplant-of the "organs of power" from one "body" to another.
A return. Paulina re-presents the king with his long absent ("dead") wife:
Prepare To see the life as lively mocked as ever Still sleep mocked death. Behold, and say 'tis well. I like your silence; it the more shows off Your wonder. But yet speak; first you, my liege. Comes it not something near?
Her natural posture. Chide me, dear stone, that I may say indeed Thou art Hermione; or rather, thou art she In thy not chiding, for she was as tender As infancy and grace. But yet, Paulina, Hermione was not so much wrinkled, nothing So aged as this seems. The Winter's Tale (5.3.18-28) Philip Lorenz
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Hermione is restored. It's like a miracle-all but for one thing. While Leontes is undoubtedly glad to see her, "Hermione was not so much wrinkled, nothing so agèd as this seems. " Her reappearance is marked by "wrinkles. " She's back, but with a twist.
The "turn to religion" in Renaissance studies is compelling for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is for the sophisticated combination of historicist methodologies it has produced for re-conceiving of the production and reception of early modern texts. If, as Kevin Sharpe has recently put it, religion in the early modern period "was not just about doctrine, liturgy or ecclesiastical government [but] was a language, an aesthetic, a structuring of meaning, an identity, a politics, " then recent scholarship has responded to the challenges posed by the complex phenomenon of religious language in diverse and productive ways. 1 Yet if religion is a "language, " and, specifically, what Arthur Marotti calls a "metaphorics" (Marotti, 2005: 11) , then much of the turn, or re-turn, to religion is marked by a sustained avoidance of critical attention to the turns themselves, the tropes of theology that "saturate" the linguistic ground of Renaissance discourse. ing to an increasingly threatening movement within the Jesuit order that was disseminating "diffuse, " "intoxicating, " and mystical spiritual texts, Suárez was one of a number of theologians who, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, began to publish "more technical, less affective" writings (De Certeau 250). As opposed to the mystical, "mystery, " for Suárez, is a "science" that leads from a knowledge of the effect back to a knowledge of the cause.
[T]he effect presupposes knowledge of the cause, and since the Holy Virgin engendered Christ as man, she is necessarily his cause. Rightly, then, it is, that in order to know and obtain knowledge of the science of the Son, one prepares the ground [by going] through the Mother. 7 (my trans.)
Christian "mystery" is thus decidedly different from, or as Ken Jackson might put it, Other than metaphor. If "metaphor is defined in terms of movement" (Ricoeur 1997:17) , then the "science" of "mystery" is designed to shut down a certain, rational movement, and open up, instead, an alternative path ("camino") toward revelation, one that goes, in this case, through the Mother. As a crucial participant in the construction of this "royal road" of spirituality, Suárez's text aspires to historical and above all theological precision. 8 Moving through an imposing collage of hundreds of biblical and other authoritative citations, Suárez's case for Mary takes the form of a systematically constructed bulwark of theological dogma. Yet, like Hermione, Suárez's formidable body-or body armor-of mystery, has a "wrinkle. " In all of their logic and scholarly rigor, the Mysteries continually run into, even as they rely on the problem of metaphor.
At the center of the theological controversy between Catholics and Protestants, of course, is precisely the question of when a metaphor is more than a metaphor. For
Catholics such as Suárez, the priest's language in the Eucharist ceremony is decidedly not metaphorical. As he puts it in his open letter to King James:
To represent is the same as to make a thing present. May Saint Jerome, interpreting Christ's words in Matthew 26, be the third witness: "After having celebrated the typical Paschal dinner and eaten lamb's meat with the apostles, he takes the bread, comfort to men's hearts, and goes to the true sacrament of Easter-just as Melchisidec, great priest of God, had done, by offering bread and wine-in order to represent the reality of his body and blood.
Maybe in reading this a heretic will also interpret the word "to represent" in a fictitious or metaphorical sense. But the sense and intention of Saint Jerome are clear: to represent is the same thing as to make the thing present, especially when the thing had been promised, predicted, or desired before. 9 Only a heretic would take the term "representation" here in a metaphorical sense.
Metaphorical reading ("the letter that killeth") is heretical reading. Yet in the case of the Mysteries, the heretic is of course always already inside the walls. 10 Legendre offers promising avenues for theorizing the link between religion, history, and law. Legal history especially cannot be left out, not only because of the enormous role the legal institution, and its "textual unconscious, " plays in the formation of early modern subjectivity, but also because, as Suárez argues, law itself emerges from the "matrix" of theology (53). And (as Suárez also argues), to arrive at knowledge of the effect (law), one has to go through the road to the cause, the "matrix, " the "Mother. "
Suárez's own road moves with the liturgical logic and dogmatic rhythm of what Legendre calls "dance": the historical means by which the Law writes its force on the body:
The institutional subject cannot come into being without a relation to this unknown yet familiar Other, which founds power and supplies it with the guarantee of Reason. One is forced to return to the mediaevals and then to a metaphysical idea which was prevalent in the scholasticism of the Counter-Reformation: dance is not a physical question, but rather a question of a beyond of the physical. (39) Legendre links this "beyond" to the history of movement from Roman Law to Canon and Custom law, at the heart of which lies an enigma: "it is impossible to approach Roman law without reinstating what I call the rights of incomprehension and the sense of enigma" by means of which it was transmitted. " 15 As figures of Truth, both the legal and the religious text constituted by mystery rest on a "sense of enigma" that requires mediation. The question is what kind? What type of mediation does the "normative function"
require? If, as Derrida has argued, "enigma, " from the Greek ainigma, fable, is linked to narrative, then mystery would seem to require this form for the production of its chief special effect, the writing of its binding force on the body. 16 For nothing binds diverse people, across space and time, as efficiently as the language of mystery and the authoritative body of commentary it produces. 17 The medium of theater, however, disrupts this desire, by dividing narrative. The "actualization of theater, " as Samuel Weber argues, "involves a temporal repetition that is suspended in a divided space (259). 18 The repetitions and divisions of theater, in other words, interrupt the story-line of enigma. Theater presents mystery with a twist.
Any "religious turn, " therefore, must take into account both the enigmatic nature of mystery and the interruptions that constitute and de-constitute it. It must focus, in other words, on the capacity of theological tropes, as a medium, to stage and disrupt the enigma that comes to life. Hermione returns-but with a difference: she's "wrinkled. " And these "wrinkles" throw a kink into the machinery of a certain cultural and historicist logic that avoids the real problem of mystery. The "religious turn" is thus faced with having to negotiate the relationship between religious and rhetorical readings-even if only as a preliminary movement on the way to reconstituting the rhetoricity of the religious trope.
Rather than shutting down exegesis to rational analysis, however, the distinction between metaphor and mystery opens on to the possibility of a rigorous engagement with Renaissance drama's relationship to the language of religion-a possibility marked in the double (closing-opening) movement of mystery.
What this return to the tropes of theology enables, then, is a shift of critical attention not only toward the operations performed by religious metaphor, but also in particular, to the media requirements these operations depend on for their force, for their special effects. 19 It is, at the end, a question of understanding how the binding force of religion speaks.
Returning to Shakespeare's summons, at the beginning of Measure for Measure, what we see is that the discourse of religion, like the discourse of power, is always a question of figure, of the mediation of what Legendre, following Lacan, calls "the Third: the object of an impossible desire. " 20 The binding power of religion is always mediated through this sovereign space of the Third-the space of mediation itself. The return to religion, therefore, is, or ought to be, a turn toward the figures that "supply" the force of an "absent"
sovereign. In the discourse of political theology, as Kantorowicz long ago pointed out, it is to turn toward the theological metaphors that effect the transfer of power from "the spiritual arcana ecclesiae . . . to the absolute power of the state:
Under the impact of those exchanges between canon and civilian glossators and commentators-all but non-existent in the earlier Middle Agessomething came into being which then was called "Mysteries of State, " and which today in a more generalizing sense is often termed "Political Theology. " Felicitous as ever, Maitland once remarked that eventually "the nation stepped into the shoes of the Prince. " While fully agreeing, I yet feel that we should add: "Not before the Prince himself had stepped into the pontifical shoes of Pope and Bishop. " 21 The transfers of mystery move with the rhythm of dance. To follow its "steps, " we have to attend to the turns.
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